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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to continue to develop the
social welfare model of Brown and Johnson [ The American
Economic Review , March, 1969, page 119]. We introduce a
normal distribution (\i,o 2 ) with mean u, variance a 2 as the
characterization of the risk that additively enters the product
demand function facing the firm. The optional price still
equals the short run marginal operating cost. We observe the
optimal output when the mean or variance of risk increases,
using the least-square method we estimate the linear relation
between the optimal output and mean or variance of risk.
In the second model we introduce the expected monopoly
profit and observe how both the optimal price and output
vary as the mean or variance of risk changes. As the final
step, we compare the results of two kinds of models, and find
that which is the least affected by risk.
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CHAPTER I
THEORY OF THE SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTION
1. 1 Introduction to the Models
When firms are competitive, the quantity of product is
set at an equilibrium point where the price is equal to the
marginal cost for each firm. But in the real world, there
is sometimes only a single firm producing a product or demands
of customers are not in steady state.
There is a respectably large body of economic literature
that presumes to establish a relationship between the polar
market structures of monopoly and pure competition and the
consequent industry performance. Almost all of this literature
considers only the case of a deterministic demand function.
This paper will consider what effect the introduction of a
stochastic demand function will have upon the predicted market
structure-performance correlation. Risk has been introduced
into economic considerations in several ways. The most common
device is to define the decision-makers 1 utility function in
terms of an expected utility hypothesis.
An alternative approach is to ignore the expected utility
hypothesis and treat the stochastic elements as strictly
limited to optimization in terms of operationally defined
economic variables. This latter approach will be followed.

*Brown and Johnson introduced models of a firm's decision-
making process under uncertainty, and demand has generally
been defined only as a single product. Brown and Johnson
introduced two ways in which the risk enters the demand
function: As an additive random variable; and as a multi-
plicative random variable. We shall choose additive random
variable way since it facilitates analysis of the problem.
We extend the model of Brown and Johnson by introducing risk
when the mean is not equal to zero. Chapter I describes the
models with normal distribution (\i,o 2 ) of risk. Chapter II
indicates the trend of the optimal output as the mean or
variance of risk increases. Chapter III introduces another
kind of model, maximization of the expected profit of a firm,
and derives the trend of output and price when the mean or
variance of risk increases . Chapter IV contains the
conclusions
.
We are interested in the social welfare function that we
develop and extend in Chapters I and II. Following Brown
and Johnson we define the social welfare function as the
difference between expected willingness to pay and expected
costs
.
In the model of maximization of the social welfare
function under linear demand, the optimal price will always
"Public Utility Pricing and Output under Risk," by
Gardner Brown, Jr. and M. Bruce Johnson, The American
Economic Review, March 1969, page 119-128.

be constant and lower than, and the optimal output will
generally be higher than, their counterparts in the riskless
model, regardless of the manner in which the risk term enters
the analysis.
In the model of Chapter III, the optimal price and output
are lower or higher than the price and output in the riskless
demand according to its mean and variance of risk.
1.2. Optimal Decisions under Deterministic Demand
Measure of welfare loss due to monopoly is consumer
surplus (shaded area 2*) . The monopoly profit would be
redistributed from the monopolist-producer to consumers by











optimal output under monopoly operation
optimal price under monopoly operation
optimal output under competitive operation
Under deterministic demand, the aggregate social welfare
is expressed as the shaded area in Figure 1 below and that is
the sum of consumers ' surplus and redistributed economic
welfare. Assumed constant cost supply.
Q: quantity of output
P: unit price of output
C: unit cost of output
the monopoly social welfare
Figure 1

Assume the demand function is linear monotone decreasing
as P increases, and dif ferentiable, Q = X(P) . So the social
welfare function W should be expressed as a function of
o
quantity Q.
P = X" 1 (Q)
W =
o
/ X L (Q) dQ c Q,
c = b + 3
where b,3 are constant and defined in
Section 1.3
Now we find the optimal price and quantity of output such






(Q) dQ - c =
= X 1 (QQ ) = c
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The second order conditions
3 2wo a -i
^o
Since the function Q is assumed to be linear and negatively
sloping with respect to P, or, inversely, the function P is





So that the welfare function is global maximum at (P_ Q) .
o o
1.3. The Model with E(u) =
Uncertainty may enter the demand function in this way
D = X(P) + u additive model
P: price of production
X(P): function of P with certainty
u: continuous random variable
f(u): probability density fucntion of u
11

The following properties are attributed to f(u)
/ u f (u) du = ; F(a) = / f (u) du
•oo —oo
+ CO
/ U f (U) dU < «>
Suppose the plant manager arbitrarily chooses values P
and z before he knows the actual value of u. The actual
sales of the product are:
X(P) + u if z
_> X(P)+u
S =
If z < X(P)+u
where z: capacity of production
X(P)+u : actual demand
The linear cost function is:
c = b E(S) + $z
b: constant marginal cost of producing output
3: constant cost for one unit of z during the demand
period
E(S'): expected sale quantity
12

The welfare function is composed of the expected value
of willingness to pay, the expected value of variable cost
and the capacity cost known with certainty so the welfare
function is chosen:
W, = E [willingness to pay] - E [average variable cost-sales]
- E [capacity cost].
Now the problem is to find out the optimum point (P*,z*)
of which the manager arbitrarily chooses before he knows an
actual value of u in order to maximize the welfare function W.
If the value of u is negative and large enough in absolute
value, demand will be less than or equal to the capacity of
the plant.
The area under the demand function is consumer's surplus.
The area for consumers ' surplus is equal to total revenue only
in the case of "perfect," or "first degree" price discrimination.
'(-«)
D r *UP ) + U
13

The shaded area is:
z-X(P)
A = / f (u)
X 1 (-u)
/ [X(t)+u]dt + P- [X(P)+u] du
When u takes on large positive values, the actual demand will
be greater than output z, the shaded areas are the consumers 1





B = / f(u)
z-X(P)
X 1 (-u)









E(L,) = / f(u) / [X(t)+u-z] dt du
z-X(P) P
E(LO = / f(u) P'[X(P)+u-z] du
z-X(P)
for u > z-X(P)
L
1
: the losses in surplus
L2 : the losses in revenue
The expected sales is equal to expected demand X(P)+u
over the entire range of random variable u such that
u <_ z-X(P) plus expected demand z over the range u >^ z-X(P)
z-X(P)
E[S] = / [X(P)+u] f(u) du + / z f(u) du
-co z-X(P)
Finally the welfare function is obtained
W1 = A + B
- C (Appendix 1)
Differentiate W.with respect to price and capacity, the






j^i = PX' (P) F[z-X(P)] - bX' (P) F[z-X(P)] =0
8W -
I f (u) [X ^(z-u) -b] du - B =92
z-X(P)
(Appendix 1)





—*=- < —— < (Appendix 2)
8P 8z
The simultaneous solutions of the two first-order conditions
indicate that price equals short run marginal operating cost,
and optimal capacity should be shosen such that marginal
capacity cost is equal to the truncated mean of the difference
between the willingness to pay and the actual price for the
marginal disappointed purchaser of the commodity.
The second order conditions are satisfied so the welfare
function is a global maximum at point (P, * z,*) the solutions
of the first order conditions.
16

Appendix 1 u s N(0 / a 2 )
z-X(P) X~ 1 (-u) z-X(P)
A= / f(u) / [X(t)+u]dtdu + / P- [x(P)+u]f (u)du
—oo p —oo
X (-u)






A+B = J* f(u) / [X(t)+u] dtdu
+00
+ / P[X(P)+u]f (u)du - E[L 1 ] - E[L2 ]
+ «> *
1 (-u)






A + B - b E(S) - £z
17

Defined x-cp, - «pL < o
X»(P) = 3 x <p) = o
8P





[X(t)+u] dtdu + P X(P)
(2) - / f(u)
z-X(P)
X x (z-u)










= (1) + (2) + (3)
Assume (1) , (2) , (3) converge to some limit as u -*• °°
9(1)
8P
= / f (u) [-X(P)-u]du + X(P) + PX 1 (P)
=




8P / f (u)
z-X(P)




[X(t)+z-X(P) ]dt + P[X(P)+z-X(P)-z
"(-X' (P))





/ X*(P)f(u)du+ [X(P)+z-X(P) ]
— CO
•f (z-X(P)) (-X(P)) - zf (z-X(P)) (-X' (P))
z-X(P)
=




/ [X(P)+u]f (u)du and / z f(u) du
z-X(P)






. 8 (2) 9 (3)
8P 8P 8P
PX 1 (P) - / P X" (P) f (u) du
z-X(P)
z-X(P)
bX'(P) / f(u) du
_oo
z-X(P) z-X(P)






















P-l/ f (u) [-X x (z-u) + P - P] du
z-X(P)
/ X~








+ / f (u)du - z f (z-X(P))
z-X(P)
- 3











1 (z-u) f(u) du
z-X(P)
b / f (u) du - 3
z-X(P)
2 W, oo






jp± - / [P - b] X' (P) f (u) du [2]
— 00





—t± f X' (P) f (u) du
8P Z
+ [P - b] X' (P) f (z-X(P)
)





•%-* = / [X~ x (z-u) -b] f (u) du - 3 [3]32
z-X(P)





^1 = / i- [X 1 (z-u)] f(u) du
8z z z-X(P) dZ
- [x" 1 (z-z+X(P)-b] f(z-X(P)j
oo
/ It [X












1.4. The Model with E(u) = y
In this section we introduce a random variable u with
nonzero mean, probability density function f(u) and finite
variance.
+co a
/ u f (u) du = y , F(a) = / f (u) du
°°
2
/ u f(u) du < °° y >
The sum of the areas A and B now becomes A'+B 1 and equals
A*+B'=A+B+ P
and the expected sales:
z-X(P)
E[S'] = / [X(P)+u] f(u) du + / z f(u) du
z-X(P)
The expression of the welfare function W is almost the
same as W, in the appendix 1
W
2
















/ [X(P)+u]f (u)du + / z f(u)du
z-X(P)
-3z




= (P-b) X' (P) / f (u) du =
3W
? <*, ,
jr-r = / [X








?f- = f X'(P)f(u)du+ [P-b]X* (P)f (z-X(P) )







—~= S ~ [X~ 1 (z-u)) f(u) du - [P-b]f (z-X(P))













(4) = / f(u)
X 1 (-u)
/ [X(t)+u]dtdu + P X(P) + yP
(5) = - / f(u)
z-X(P)
X 1 (z-u)
/ [X(t)+u-z]dt + P[X(P)+u-z] du
(6) = -b
z-X(P)










= / f (u) [-X(P)-u]du + PX 1 (P) + X(P) + y
=
-X(P) - y + P X 1 (P) + X(P) + y
= P X' (P)
8(5) , 8(6) . . .. - 8(2) , 8(3!
and ——- are just the same expressions of r~ and8P 8P BP 3P
respectively in appendix 1.
So that the first- and second-order conditions for maximiza-




1.5. Extension of the Model in Section 1.4
In the previous section we introduced u as a continuous
random variable with nonzero mean. Now we would like to move
the demand function upward a distance u, and random variable
u becomes random variable v with the probability density
function f (v) but the mean of v is equal to zero, and the
same variance with u.
+
00
/ v f (v) dv =
/ v f(v) dv <
If the value of v is negative, and large enough to make
demand smaller than the capacity z.
The area A" now equals
:
z-X(P)-y
A" / f(v) X
X" 1 (-y-v)





If v is positive and large enough, demand will be greater
than z and area B" equals:





[X(t)+y+v]d.t + p[x(P)+y+v] dv
- EI^] - E[L
2 ]
X 1 (z-y-v)

















+ P[X(P)+y] - E[L1 ] - E[L2 ]
Expected sales equals:
z-X(P)-y
E[S" ] = / [X(P)+y+v]f (v)dv + / z f(v)dv
z-X(P)-y
The welfare function W^ is:
W
3
= A" + B" - b E[S" ] - 3z
29

The first-order conditions for maximization
aw
-
• / [P-b] X 1 (P) f (v) dv =9P
z-X(P)-y
8W oo
*-= = / f (v) [X x (z-y-v) -b] dv - 3 =dz
z-X(P)-y
Appendix 4
The optimum price is still equal to b, independent of
any constant value that is added to X(P).
The second-order conditions are negative if P > b
82W 8 2W







= A" + B" - b E[S] - £z
X
1 (-y-v)
(7) = /f(v) /
—oo p
[X(t)+y+v]dtdv + P[X(P)+y]













= (7) + (8) + (9)
Assume that all integrals involved in taking derivatives






/ f (v) [-X(P)-y-v]dv + X(P) + \i + P X 1 (P)
= P X 1 (P)
8P / f (v)
z-X(P)-y
- [X(P)+y+v-z] + X(P) + y + v - z






+ P[X(P)+y+z-X(P)-y-z] (-X 1 (P)
)









f (z-X(P)-y) (-X' (P)) - zf (z-X(P)-y). (-X- (P))
z-X(P)-y







PX' (P) - / PX' (P) f (v) dv
z-X(P)-y
z-X(P)-y
b V X' (P) f (v) dv
— oo
9W z-X(P)-y





















-b8z [X(P)Y+z-^( p )~y] f(z-X(P)-y)
+ / f( v ) dv - z f(z-X(P)-y) - 3
z-X(P)-y





















r~- = / [P-b] X' (P) f (v) dv
This integral exists when v increases toward infinity
so we can take the derivative
8
2W z-X(P)-y




/ X'(P)f(v)dv- [P-b] (X'(P))^ f(z-X(P)-y)
•oo






T~ = / [X X (z-y-v) -b] f(v) dv - 3dZ
z-X(P)-y






5^= / |- [X" 1 (z-y-v) -b] f(v) dv
dz* z-X(P)-y dZ
- [X
_1 (z-y-z+X(P)+y) -b] f(z-X(P)-y)











Numerical Computations and Graphs
2.1. The Trend of Output when Variance of Risk Increases
In the general case, demand function has a linear form,
downward sloping.
X(P) = a + cP
a: a constant (> 0)
c: a constant (< 0)
P: unit price of output
b,$: are positive constants and are defined in the
previous section
Under the stochastic demand, we see that the optimum
price always equals b, the short run marginal operating cost,
and is independent of the mean and variance of risk. But
the optimum output z is dependent on the mean and variance of
risk. Now we study the optimal output z when variance of
risk increases.









L (z *-u) -b] f(u) du - 3 = (2)
z *-X(b)






X(P) = a + cP
~ j v~l/ \ z-u-aand X (z-u) =
Substituting in (2) :
/ [ ^—-^ - b] f(u) du - =
z-a-cb
1 u 2 ID 22? , 1du - a
D f^T° |/17
= D / —L^ - e ^ —i- e 2 a - c£ =0 (3)
where: D = z-a-cb
The function (3) is an implicit function of z and a
3Z fg
8a fz
fa: derivative of (3) with respect to










-2 > appendix 6




9 25— > for any original point (z,a),
do
that means that when a increases then z increases, or a and





,21 u 1 u z
oo —
—
..,*- oo — i i -x
f(oz) = D / "7z=r pr e du - / ~zzz" n e du - cp =
D \f2F ° D fW
/ -1- H e 2 a du = a / -J- Xe 2 dX






1 u 2 1 D 2






1 u 2 1 D 2 1 D
2
= T-i-ie" 2 ^du - D^ie 2 ^ -_£_(-*! (2D) >e 2 ^
D Nf2V



































1 u 2 1 v 2

























2.2. The Trend of Output When Mean of Risk
Distribution Increases
When the mean of risk distribution is not equal to
zero, the optimum decisions are the solutions of the first-










u ~ N(y,a 2 ) a:constant
1/ U-y .
2
f (u) = - - e
with the same demand function in section 2.1. The implicit
function f(y,z) becomes:




v D-y , 1 2 v a ' a 2 v a ' D _f (y,z) = ——- I
-—















And, as appendix 7 shows:
9z
3y
= 1 > o
So that the optimum output increases the same amount as
the mean of risk distribution increases, or decreases the

















f z = _ f —-—- e du + —= (-










D-y, ,1* 2 l a '
V 2it
(. 1 2 C^tL) (i)
fz =
1 /U-u.
00 -— ( H)



















i / -±- e 2 ° du + S^i. /






° du - 231 A_ e 2 a
4(H3i)2
— / ——— e u du
a D vf2T




2.3. Consequence of Section 1.5
If u is normally distributed with mean y and variance
a 2 , and v is also normally distributed with mean zero and
variance a 2, the same variance as u.
The demand function is just the same as in the previous
section,
X(P) = a + cP




z * is the solution of this equation
2
-I(Hlii) 2 -I(DzE) 2
f (y,z) = (D-y) / -J— i e 2 a du — e 2 a - c3 =
D \f2T ° \J~2tT






f (y,z) = (D-y) [1 - *(2lH) ] — e 2 ° - c(3 =
° \f2lT
and the solutions of section 1.5 are the same solutions of
section 1.4 above (Appendix 8)
45
r
Thus the demand under normal distribution of risk with
mean \i and variance a 2 is the same as adding a positive
constant y to the demand and the risk becomes normally
distributed with mean zero and the same variance; or the









z * is the solution of equation f*(yz)
-1
f*(yz) = / [X -L (z-y-v) -b] f (v) dv - 3 =
z-X(P)-y
CO °°




















2.4. Numerical Computations and Graphs
a = 10 units
c = -1
X(P) = 10 - P
b = $2
3 = $1
Use the model in section 1.3 with mean of risk distribution

















There are many optimum output z when variance a 2 has some











The relationship between z* and a is expressed by the implicit
function above. Now we try to express z as a linear function
of a.
z = a + Ba
48

Using the least squares method, we can obtain the value
of a and B:
a = 6.3163
b = .745
z = 6.3163 + .745a
This function is upward sloping with o, so z increases as
the value of a increases:
49

Now we hold the variance o 2 constant and equal to 1.
Let the mean of risk distribution vary and observe the
optimum output z*. Under these conditions the optimum output
z* is the solution of the equation f(y,z) = in section 2.2.
We rewrite that equation as the following:




° - c$ =
\f2~i
or:
D-y . 4(^) 2(D-y) [1- *(^) ] - —*z
\T2T
- c$ =












We can express z as a linear function of y, this function is
upward sloping with y.






THEORY OF MAXIMIZATION OF THE EXPECTED PROFIT
3.1. The Model of Maximization of Profit
In this model, we also set the quantity z and price P
before we know the actual demands. Demand is a random
variable, and it is a function of P and u:
Demand = X(P) + u
where u is normally distributed with mean y and variance a 2
The expression of profit is:
n = pq„ - cz




= min[X(P) + u, z]
c' = cost per unit in production
Therefore:
n = P[X(P) + u] - c'z if X(P) + u < z
II
2
= Pz - c'z if X(P) + u >_ z
z-X(P)




Our problem is to try to maximize the expected profit .




= [X(P) + P X' (P) - z + y] $(Y) + z 2_ e 2 =
Y =
z~x ( p )-y
^
E(II)
= P[l - $(Y) ] - C ' =
o Z
Appendix 9





= 2X' (P) $(Y) + [X(P) + P X' (P) - z + y] f (z-X(P))
8P2
1 y2






-P f (z-X(P)) < o
Appendix 9
z-X(P)
where: $(Y) = / f(u) du
— 00
In our model with the linear demand X(P) = 10 - P,








= -2 $(Y) - P f (Y) <
9P
So that the solutions of the first-order conditions are the





E[n] = / P[X(P) + u] -c'z f(u) du






X(P) + u + P X 1 (P) f(u) du
P[X(P)+z-X(P) ] - c'z f(z-X(P)) (-X' (P))
+ / z f(u) du - [P - c']z f (z-X(P) ) (-X' (P)
)
z-X(P)
[X(P) + P X'(P)] $( { ' &) + f u f(u) du
a












/ -c' f (u) du + P(X(P) + z - X(P) ) - c'z
.










= [X' (P) +X'(P)] / f(u) du + [X(P) +PX'(P)-z+y]
8P
f (z-X(P)j(-X' (P)) -
_1 z-X(P)-y 2
x , (p)( z-X(P)- y) _l__ e 2
(
a
2X'(P) $(Y) + [X(P) +PX'(P)+y-z] f(z-X(P))
_1 Y 2
1 2
- X 1 (P) Y -~— e *
V 2-TT
8 E(H) = 2X , (p) $(y) + [x(p)+px . (P)+p_ z] f ( z -x(P)) (-X 1 (P))
3P
1 2










-P f (z-X(P) ) <
56

3.2 . The Optimal Point (P*,z*) under a Change in
Mean and Variance of the Distribution u
We introduce the same demand function, and the same
value of a, c, b, £ .
X(P) = a + cP
where: a = 10 b = 2
c = -1 6 = 1
c' = b+3 = 3
The first-order conditions now become:
(5) [a + 2cP + y - z] $(Y) + z — e = n
VTfT
(6) P[l - $(Y) ] - c' =
Now we keep the mean constant and equal to zero. The
following results are the solutions of equations (5) and (6)
according to each value of variance a 2 .











As variance increases, the price slowly decreases, and
the optimum output increases a little.
Using least squares, we can find the function z*(a) , and







_a V = *2 + B 2 a





Now keep the variance a constant and equal to 1. The






























When y increases, both price and optimum output increase
We can estimate the linear relationship between z* and y,
P* and y.


















We have developed two kinds of models, the first is to
maximize the expected social welfare, the second is to
maximize the expected monopoly profit; both models involve
random demand. There are three essential factors in
determining the optimal price and production level decisions
for a firm.
a) the shape of the demand curve
b) the manner in which risk enters the demand function
c) the distribution of risk u.
Under riskless demand, the optimum price and output for
maximization of the welfare function are determined. Adding
risk to the demand function X(P) reduces the optimum price.
If the mean and variance of risk u are allowed to vary,
the optimal price P* remains constant and equals the short
run marginal operating cost, but the optimal output varies
directly with mean or variance of risk u. Also, the optimal
output under risk is greater than the equilibrium output in
the deterministic model.
When the variance of risk stays constant and equals one,
the optimal output varies directly and the same scale with
the mean of risk u.
The optimal solutions are the same when the random linear
demand curve X(P) + u with normal distribution (\i,a 2 ) of
62

risk u is shifted upward a distance y with normal distribution
(0,a 2 ) of risk u.
It is easy to understand this effect because of the
symmetry property of normal distributions. In Chapter III
the demand function and the risk u for the expected profit
model are the same as in Chapters I and II. With the mean
of risk set equal to zero and allowing the variance to
increase, the optimum price decreases slowly and the optimum
output increases slowly.
Allowing the mean to vary while the variance is set to
one causes optimal price and output to vary directly but very
little. Therefore, this model is less sensitive to risk than
the models of Chapters I and II. If the demand curve is not
linear downward sloping and additively separable in P and u
or risk has a complicated distribution, then it is difficult
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